Limitation Periods

What this answers

Which period applies, and what could move it

The Limitation of Actionable Rights Law of 2012, Law 66(I)/2012, fixes different periods for different claims. One year for defamation. Three for negligence. Six for most contracts. Fifteen for a judgment. Getting the category right is the whole question, because the wrong category can be five years out.

The Law is also not the only source. Section 24 preserves special periods in five other statutes, and where one of those applies the rules in this Law, including the 1 January 2016 start date, the section 27A suspension and the court's power to extend, do not reach it. Those five are on the list below, marked as such.

Limitation is not taken by the court of its own motion. Under section 20 the court does not raise it, and under section 21 a party with a legitimate interest must plead it. A claim that is out of time is not struck out automatically, and a defendant who fails to plead the point loses it.

What "the basis of the action" means

Almost every argument about limitation is really an argument about one date, and it is not usually the date people reach for first. Section 2 defines the basis of the action as the totality of the facts that found the actionable right to which the action relates. Section 3 then provides that time begins to run when that basis is completed.

Two words in that do the work. Totality means every element the claim needs, not the first thing that went wrong. Completed means the clock waits for the last of those elements to fall into place. Where an element arrives later than the conduct complained of, the basis is not complete until it does, and time has not started.

The practical consequence is that the date to enter above is often not the obvious one:

• In contract it is not the date the contract was signed. A contract that is performed properly founds no claim at all. What founds the claim is the breach, so that is where the totality of facts is completed
• In a claim for a debt it is not the date of the invoice or of the loan, but the date payment fell due and was not made
• In negligence it is not necessarily the date of the careless act. Damage is part of what the claim needs, so an act in one year that causes loss in another completes its basis in the later year

The Law itself supplies three worked examples of the same idea, and each one is a provision rather than an inference. Under section 6(2), where the injured person learned of the bodily injury later, time runs from the day of that knowledge. Under section 7(3), where a loan fixes no repayment date, time does not begin before a written demand is served. Under section 14, where the claim concerns fraud, deliberate concealment or a mistake, time does not begin until the claimant discovers it or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.

This is why the result above is indicative rather than a deadline. The arithmetic is simple and the calculator does it correctly. Which date goes into it is a question of fact and law on your documents, and it is the question the other side will fight.

What the Law fixes, and where

Section 4 sets the general rule: unless another law provides otherwise, no action is brought after ten years from the completion of the basis of the action. Everything else is an exception to it.

• Twelve years on or for or in relation to a mortgage or pledge, section 5. Under section 5(2) proceedings for the disposal of mortgaged immovable property or a pledged item under any law count as an action
• Six years for a civil wrong generally, section 6(1)
• Three years where the claim is for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of statutory duty, section 6(2). Where the person who suffered the bodily injury learned of it later, the period runs from the day of that knowledge
• One year for defamation or malicious falsehood, section 6(4)
• Six years for a claim relating to a contract, section 7(1)
• Three years for the agreed or reasonable remuneration of a lawyer, doctor, dentist, architect, civil engineer, contractor or other independent professional, section 7(2)
• Six years for a book debt owed by or to a credit institution, for a bill of exchange, cheque, promissory note or ordinary note, and for hire purchase, factoring, leasing, credit card use and overdrafts, section 8. Loans are expressly excluded from that paragraph
• Eight years from the death for a claim by an heir or legatee in relation to the estate, and for a claim as to the validity of a will, section 9
• Fifteen years on or for or in relation to a judgment, from the day it became final, section 10

The loan with no repayment date is its own case. Under section 7(3), where a contract arises from a loan that fixes no specific or ascertainable repayment date and makes no prior notice to the debtor a condition of repayment, time does not begin before a written demand for repayment is served on the debtor by or on behalf of the lender, or where there are joint lenders by or on behalf of one of them. The proviso adds that where the debtor gave a mortgage or pledge as security for the loan, section 5 applies instead.

An action for accounts follows the claim behind it. Section 11 provides that no action for the provision of accounts is brought after the expiry of the limitation period under the Law in relation to the demand from which the obligation to provide accounts arises.

Two rules move the start for everyone

Nothing counts before 1 January 2016

Section 3 provides that time begins to run when the basis of the action is completed, and then adds a proviso: without affecting sections 24 and 29, time begins to be counted from 1 January 2016. Section 26, the transitional provision that had suspended the operation of the Law, was repealed with effect from that date by section 3 of Law 207(I)/2015, and section 28 preserves any rights given by that suspension.

The practical effect is blunt. A cause of action that accrued in 2009 and one that accrued in 2015 both start counting on the same day. Note the words the proviso opens with: it operates without affecting sections 24 and 29, so it does not reach the special periods preserved by section 24.

Negligence and breach of statutory duty gained 39 months

Section 27A provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of the Law, the limitation period of an actionable right for negligence or breach of statutory duty against a natural or legal person is suspended, from the date of entry into force of the Limitation of Actionable Rights (Amending) Law of 2021, for a period of 39 months.

The figure reached 39 in stages. Law 58(I)/2021, published on 20 April 2021, inserted section 27A with a period of twelve months. Law 53(I)/2022, published on 19 April 2022, replaced twelve with twenty four. Law 26(I)/2023, published on 21 April 2023, replaced twenty four with thirty nine. Measured from 20 April 2021, thirty nine months ends on 20 July 2024. Nothing has amended the Law since.

Two points of precision are worth keeping. The section names negligence and breach of statutory duty. It does not name nuisance, which sits alongside them in section 6(2), so the calculator does not apply the suspension when nuisance is selected. And whether section 27A reaches a particular claim is a question of construction on which this page takes no position beyond reproducing the text: what the calculator does is show the arithmetic on the face of the provision, with the suspension applied and the dates visible, so that you can see exactly how much of your date depends on it.

Five periods this Law does not touch

Section 29(2) provides that where a period in a special law conflicts with this Law, this Law prevails, but that is expressly subject to section 24. Section 24 then lists what survives untouched, and these are the traps, because a claimant who reaches for the familiar three or six years gets the wrong answer.

• A death caused by a civil wrong. Section 58(20) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148, requires the dependants' action to be brought within three years of the death, not of the accrual. Under section 58(11) it is brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator, under section 58(12) the dependants may sue in their own names if no action is brought within twelve months of the death, and under section 58(13) only one action may be brought for the same death
• A claim against the estate of someone who has died. Section 34(3) of the Administration of Estates Law, Cap. 189, bars proceedings on a cause of action that survived against the estate unless proceedings were already pending at the date of death, or the cause of action arose at least six months before the death and proceedings are taken within six months of the personal representative taking out representation. Where no representation is taken out within two years of the death, proceedings may not be taken after that date. The proviso to section 34(1) also provides that a cause of action for defamation does not survive at all
• A defective product. Law 105(I)/1995 gives three years from when the injured person knew, or could reasonably have known, of the damage, the defect and the identity of the producer, and extinguishes the right in any event ten years after that particular product was put into circulation
• Property between spouses. Section 15 of the Regulation of Property Relations of Spouses Law, Law 232/1991, gives three years after the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, and treats a counterclaim as a separate action brought on the same date as the action in which it is raised
• Sale of immovable property. Section 24(d) preserves the special periods in the Sale of Immovable Property (Specific Performance) Law of 2011. The action for specific performance itself is referred by section 6(1)(b) of that Law to the ordinary contract period, so it is six years, but the deposit deadline of six months in section 3(1)(c) and the one year for registration in section 9(1) are separate and are the ones that usually bite. Section 12 allows the court to permit a deposit or an action out of time

Section 25 goes further still and disapplies the Law entirely to rights and obligations of public law.

Why a calculated date is a starting point

The Law contains a long list of events that stop the clock, restart it, or prevent it from beginning. Only one of them, the interruption in section 17, is mechanical enough to model, and it is offered as the second date field. The rest are questions of fact.

Time that does not start, or is suspended

Section 12 provides that time does not begin to run, or is suspended if it began, between spouses during the marriage even if the marriage is later annulled, between parents and children during minority, between trustees and beneficiaries during the beneficiary's minority, between executors or administrators and heirs or legatees during their minority, and between cohabiting partners during the cohabitation.

Section 13 suspends time while the claimant was prevented by a moratorium or by force majeure from bringing the action in the last six months of the period, while the defendant or a person for whom the defendant is responsible prevented the claimant from suing in that last six months, on the death of the person entitled to sue until three months after an executor or administrator is appointed, and while a mediation is under way.

Section 14 provides that time does not begin to run where the action concerns the defendant's fraud, where the defendant deliberately concealed a fact relating to the basis of the action, or where the action seeks relief from the consequences of a mistake, until the claimant discovers or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. Deliberate breach of duty in circumstances making it particularly difficult to discover counts as deliberate concealment. Under section 14(2) time runs from the discovery by an agent or other person who binds the claimant, not only by the claimant.

Section 16 excludes any period during which the person against whom time runs is under a disability, meaning under 18 or unable through mental or physical illness to manage their property and affairs, and has no personal representative who is not themselves under a disability.

Section 15 provides that a suspended period under sections 12 and 13 is not counted, and that when the ground of suspension ceases the period in no case completes before a further six months have passed.

Section 23 suspends time in relation to causes of action connected with immovable property in an area not controlled by the Government of the Republic, with movable property left in such an area and not moved to the free area, with property under custodianship under the Turkish Cypriot Properties Law, and in favour of or against a person whose fate is unknown as a result of the Turkish invasion. That last suspension ceases against a missing person once an administrator is appointed under the Missing Persons Law.

Time that restarts from zero

Section 17 interrupts the period, so that it begins to run afresh, where the person liable acknowledges the right of action against them in writing, where in the case of a monetary debt the person liable makes a payment exceeding 50 per cent of the total including any interest payable, on the bringing of an action, and on the commencement of arbitration proceedings, which the section defines by reference to the notice calling on the other party to appoint or agree an arbitrator. A written acknowledgment is the one most often given without advice, and it can revive a claim the debtor believed was gone. Where an action is withdrawn without creating res judicata, or dismissed on non substantive grounds, the time already run is treated as suspension time under section 15, and an identical action brought within six months takes the benefit of the earlier interruption.

Time the court can add

Section 22 allows the court to extend the period by up to two years where it considers that just and reasonable in the circumstances, on an originating summons before the action is brought or by interlocutory application after limitation has been pleaded. That is the outer date shown in the result. Section 6(3) gives a separate discretion in claims for bodily injury or death, to disapply the limitation provisions altogether, having regard to the reasons for and length of the delay, the claimant's or the deceased's incapacity, their efforts to obtain the necessary material, the defendant's attitude to those efforts, and the effect of the delay on the evidence. That discretion is not exercised more than two years after the day the right became time barred, which is why the same outer horizon applies.

Two provisions worth knowing about

Section 18 provides that a counterclaim is treated as filed on the same day as the action against the counterclaimant if its basis arose from the same or substantially the same facts. Otherwise it is a separate action and cannot be brought if the period has run by the date it is filed. Section 19 provides that payments made by the debtor in ignorance of the completion of the limitation period are not recoverable.

Where the periods come from

The periods and rules under the Law are taken from the consolidated text of the Limitation of Actionable Rights Law of 2012, Law 66(I)/2012, as published by CyLaw. The amendment history there ends with Law 26(I)/2023.

The three amendments to section 27A are taken from the Official Gazette: Law 58(I)/2021 at Issue 4830 of 20 April 2021, Law 53(I)/2022 at Issue 4888 of 19 April 2022, and Law 26(I)/2023 at Issue 4943 of 21 April 2023.

The five special periods are taken from the consolidated texts of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148, the Administration of Estates Law, Cap. 189, the Defective Products (Civil Liability) Law, Law 105(I)/1995, the Regulation of Property Relations of Spouses Law, Law 232/1991, and the Sale of Immovable Property (Specific Performance) Law of 2011.

Checked on 15 August 2026. These laws have been amended repeatedly and this page does not update itself.